Alice goes to the hospital in the United States. His doctor and his health insurance company know the details – and often the government of his state knows it too. Thirty-three of the states that know these details do not keep the information for themselves and do not limit their sharing to researchers. Instead, they give or sell a version of this information, and they are often legally required to do so. States are turning to you as an IT specialist, IT specialist, policy expert, consultant, or privacy officer, and ask if the data is anonymous? Can any one be identified? It is very likely that you do not know if there are real risks. Here's how I compared patient names to publicly available health data sold by the state of Washington and how the state reacted. This type of experience helps to improve data sharing practices, reduce privacy risks and encourage the development of better technology solutions. – Only you, your doctor and others can know, Latanya Sweeney . Science of Technology. 2015092903. September 29, 2015.
Dr. Sweeney's first contribution was to link patient-specific depersonalized medical data to a population registry (for example, a voters list) to re-identify patients by name. [cite, cite]. She then showed that "87% of the US population is uniquely identified by {date of birth, gender, postal code}".

Ten years ago, funding sources refused to fund re-identification experiments, unless the results show that there would be no risk or that all problems could be solved by a new one. promising theoretical technology under development. Financial resources were not available to support rigorous scientific studies otherwise.

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